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Abstract
With the recent developments of convolutional neural
networks, deep learning for 3D point clouds has shown sig-
nificant progress in various 3D scene understanding tasks
including 3D object recognition. In a safety-critical envi-
ronment, it is however not well understood how such neu-
ral networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples. In
this work, we explore adversarial attacks for point cloud-
based neural networks with a focus on real-world data. We
propose a general formulation for adversarial point cloud
generation via `0-norm optimisation. Our method gener-
ates adversarial examples by attacking the classification
ability of the point cloud-based networks while consider-
ing the perceptibility of the examples and ensuring the min-
imum level of point manipulations. The proposed method
is general and can be realised in different attack strate-
gies. Experimental results show that our method achieves
the state-of-the-art performance with 80% of attack success
rate while manipulating only about 4% of the points. We
also found that compared with synthetic data, real-world
point cloud classification is more vulnerable to attacks.
1. Introduction
Deep learning has shown great potentials in solving a
wide spectrum of computer vision tasks. In life-crucial ap-
plications, one concern is that deep neural networks can be
vulnerable to adversarial examples, a special kind of inputs
that can fool the networks to make undesirable predictions.
Several adversarial attack techniques have been proposed
to generate such examples. By contrast, adversarial defense
methods have been developed to detect and neutralise ad-
versarial examples. Therefore, understanding how adver-
sarial attacks and defenses operate is of great importance to
make deep learning techniques more reliable and robust.
With the growing popularity of low-cost 3D sensors and
light-field cameras, the community has also started investi-
gating the vulnerability of neural networks on 3D data, es-
pecially 3D point clouds [30, 13, 12, 31, 27]. However,
existing works focus on common scenarios, such as gener-
ating adversarial point clouds by perturbing points in input
point clouds. While such approaches have a high attack suc-
cess rate, the perturbations are not imperceptible and can be
easily defended by outlier detection or noise removal algo-
rithms. In addition, existing adversarial attack methods do
not perform optimally since all points in point clouds are
involved in the manipulation.
In this work, we investigate 3D adversarial attacks and
defenses in more extreme but practical settings. First, we
explore how to generate adversarial point clouds such that
the number of points perturbed from the original point cloud
is minimal while maintaining the perceptibility of the point
cloud. We propose a new formulation for adversarial point
cloud generation that can be adapted to various settings and
realised in different attack strategies. Second, we explore
adversarial attacks to point clouds obtained from real-world
3D scans. We show that networks trained with real-world
3D point clouds are more vulnerable to attacks than net-
works trained with synthetic data. In summary, our contri-
butions include:
• A new technique to generate minimal adversarial point
clouds. We formulate the problem using an `0 optimi-
sation that can then be approximately solved by an `1
optimisation;
• A new theoretical formulation that generalises two adver-
sarial point clouds generation techniques: point perturba-
tion and point addition;
• A benchmark on adversarial attacks on both synthetic and
real-world 3D point clouds.
2. Related Work
In this section, we review 3D deep learning techniques,
especially those working on 3D point clouds. We then dis-
cuss adversarial attack and defense methods in 3D in gen-
eral and some variants that assume similar extreme settings
to that we use in this paper.
3D Deep Learning. Recent availability of 3D
datasets [29, 3, 7, 1, 5, 2, 25] has led to significant
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advances in deep learning on 3D data. In this domain,
several works focus on designing convolution operations
to make convolutional neural networks learn features
from point clouds directly [19, 20, 11, 8, 26, 23, 9, 35].
Some convolutions are extended to support rotation in-
variance [21, 34, 18, 32]. Such convolutions allow scene
understanding tasks such as object recognition, semantic
segmentation, and object detection to be trained directly
with 3D point clouds, achieving competitive performance.
In this work, we use PointNet [19] as the base neural net-
work to investigate adversarial examples. Among the men-
tioned 3D datasets, we use ModelNet40 [29] and ScanOb-
jectNN [25] for our experiments. ModelNet40 contains a
collection of CAD models used for benchmarking state-of-
the-art object classification techniques. ScanObjectNN is a
dataset of real-world 3D point clouds designed to further
benchmark the performance of object classification.
Adversarial Point Clouds. There exist a few studies on
adversarial attacks and defenses for point cloud classifica-
tion [30, 13, 12, 31, 27]. For instance, Xiang et al. [30] first
suggested an optimisation algorithm based on C&W frame-
work [16] using the Chamfer and Hausdorff distance. Liu
et al. [13] extended the fast gradient sign method (FGSM)
in [6] to 3D point clouds and showed how to construct ad-
versarial examples using mesh and clipping norm. In gen-
eral, the basic ideas in these works follow previous adver-
sarial attack techniques in 2D domain, which focus on how
a point cloud should be perturbed to make an adversarial
example. Readers are referred to [33] for a comprehensive
review on adversarial attacks and defenses on images.
Several works suggest viable perturbation techniques on
point clouds. For instance, adversarial point clouds can be
generated by perturbing points individually [30] or in bun-
dles [30, 12, 31]. It is also possible to mix newly added
points with perturbed points in a point cloud to make an
adversarial example [12]. Alternatively, some methods opt
to drop points based on point saliency [36, 28]. There are
also works [12, 27] that further consider perceptibility con-
straints applied to local meshes.
In contrast to adversarial attacks, countermeasures for
adversarial point clouds have been so far scarce. Typical
approaches to defense include removing outliers or salient
points [13] and noise removal [37, 31]. In the latter case, the
authors proposed to use a neural network that consists of a
new layer for outlier removal combined with point cloud
upsampling.
Minimal Adversarial Attacks. In 2D domain, there is
a specific family of techniques that focus on perturbing a
minimum number of pixels in adversarial attacks. For in-
stance, Papernot et al. [17] perturbed pixels by considering
the saliency map based on gradients. Carlini et al. [16] ex-
tended this method and used `0 optimisation to minimise
the number of pixels to perturb. Recently, Modas et al. [14]
and Croce et al. [4] focused on how to perturb a sparse
set of pixels but still achieved good perceptibility. Local
search and evolutionary algorithms are also applied to ob-
tain sparse perturbations [15, 24, 22]. In this paper, we also
explore adversarial attacks that only perturb a minimal set
of points. However, unlike the above works, we propose a
new formulation that is able to generalise various adversar-
ial point cloud generation strategies.
3. Proposed Method
We propose a general formulation for adversarial attacks
to 3D point clouds using `0 optimisation. We show that our
formulation can be adapted to various settings and realised
in different attack strategies.
Our problem of interest can be stated as follows. Let
P = {p1, ...,pN} be an input set of N points where
each point pi is represented by a vector of its coordinates
pi = [pi,x, pi,y, pi,z]
> ∈ R3. Let F denote a point-
based neural network, e.g., PointNet [19], and Fi(P ) de-
note the probability that the point set P is classified into
the i-th class or the i-th element of the logits of the in-
put of softmax layer. If i∗ is the true class label of the
point cloud P , then i∗ = argmaxi Fi(P ). Let P
′ be an
adversarial example of P . We aim to find P ′ such that
argmaxi Fi(P ) 6= argmaxi′ Fi′(P ′), i.e., P ′ and P are
classified into different classes by the network F .
In the following, we present a general model to generate
P ′ using `0 optimisation and describe in details two differ-
ent ways to realise our model: point perturbation and point
addition.
3.1. Point Perturbation
3.1.1 Formulation
Given a point cloud P , we aim to find a minimal set of
points that can be shifted to generate an adversarial point
cloud P ′ to attack the network F . In this case, the adver-
sarial point cloud P ′ generated by the point perturbation
process will have the same number of points (with P ). In-
tuitively, the point perturbation process must satisfy the fol-
lowing conditions: (i) the perceptibility of the point cloud is
maintained during the perturbation, i.e., the perturbed point
cloud P ′ should not much deform from the original point
cloud P ; (ii) a minimal number of points in P are selected
for perturbation; and (iii) the original point cloud P and per-
turbed point cloud P ′ are classified into different classes by
the network F .
We express the selection of points in P for perturbation
by a binary indication vector a = [a1, ..., aN ]
> ∈ {0, 1}N
where ai is 1 if pi is selected, and 0 otherwise. Suppose
that E = {e1, ..., eN} is the set of perturbations, in which
ei = [ei,x, ei,y, ei,z]
> ∈ R3 is the perturbation vector to be
applied on pi to obtain p′i. Applying perturbation set E on
the point cloud P results in an adversarial point cloud P ′ as
P ′ = {p′i = pi + aiei | pi ∈ P} . (1)
The process of generation of P ′ can be formulated as,
min
a,E
f(P,a, E) = min
a,E
{λ1‖a‖0 + λ2D(P, P ′)}
s.t. argmax
i
Fi(P ) 6= argmax
i′
Fi′(P
′)
(2)
where ‖a‖0 = #{i : ai 6= 0, i = 1, ..., N} is the `0 norm of
a (i.e., the number of non-zero elements in a) andD(P, P ′)
is some distance between P and P ′.
The optimisation problem defined in Equation (2) covers
all the aforementioned conditions. In particular, the first
term, ‖a‖0 in the objective function f(P,a, E) imposes
the quantity of selected points in the point selection pro-
cess while the second term, D(P, P ′) constrains the per-
ceptibility of the adversarial point cloud P ′ w.r.t. the orig-
inal point cloud P . As will be explained later in this sec-
tion, D(P, P ′) can be defined using different distance met-
rics. The constraint argmaxi Fi(P ) 6= argmaxi′ Fi′(P ′)
ensures the generated point cloud P ′ can fool the network
F , i.e., F would not classify P and P ′ into the same class.
However, the search space of (2) is too large, e.g.,
O(2N − 1) for a set of N points. In order to reduce the
search space, salient map [36] and critical points [19] can
be used. Qi et al. [18] suggested the concept of critical
points which are a subset of the input point cloud that has a
great impact on the classification output. Furthermore, crit-
ical points can be ranked by their distances from the nearest
points in the point cloud [28]. In this work, we use saliency
map and critical points to initialize our solution when opti-
mizing Equation (2).
3.1.2 Relaxed Formulation
To solve the constrained optimisation problem in (2), we
convert it into an unconstrained optimisation problem using
a Lagrange multiplier-like form as:
min
a,E
f(P,a, E)
= min
a,E
{λ1‖a‖0 + λ2D(P, P ′) + λ3h(P ′)}
(3)
where, like [30], we define,
h(P ′) = max
{
0, Fi∗(P
′)−max
i∗ 6=i′
Fi′(P
′)
}
(4)
where i∗ is the true class label of the point set P .
The problem in (3) is NP-hard in general and thus can be
relaxed as
min
a,E
f(P,a, E)
= min
a,E
{λ1‖a‖1 + λ2D(P, P ′) + λ3h(P ′)}
(5)
where ‖a‖1 =
∑N
i=1 ai is the `1 norm of a.
The optimisation problem defined in (10) formulates our
proposed adversarial generation method. This formulation
is general and can be adapted conveniently to other adver-
sarial generation strategies, e.g., point addition.
3.1.3 Perceptibility
There are several ways to realise the perceptibilityD(P, P ′)
in (10). If we assume the correspondence between each
point pi ∈ P and its perturbed point p′i ∈ P ′ defined in (11)
is maintained, then we can defineD(P, P ′) using Euclidean
distances between pi and p′i as
DEuclidean(P, P
′) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(ai‖ei‖2) . (6)
However, such correspondences are not always well de-
fined, e.g., when the number of points changes in the case
of point addition, making Euclidean distance not a valid
choice. We further propose to use Chamfer distance and
Hausdorff distance to measure perceptibility. Specifically,
we can define D(P, P ′) as
DChamfer(P, P
′) = max
{
1
|P |
∑
pi∈P
min
p′j∈P ′
‖pi − p′j‖2,
1
|P ′|
∑
p′j∈P ′
min
pi∈P
‖p′j − pi‖2
}
(7)
or
DHausdorff (P, P
′) = max
{
max
pi∈P
{
min
p′j∈P ′
‖pi − p′j‖2
}
,
max
p′j∈P ′
{
min
pi∈P
‖p′j − pi‖2
}}
.
(8)
Note that, as defined in (7) and (8), the Chamfer distance
and Hausdorff distance do not require the same of number
of points in both the point clouds P and P ′. Hence, they
can be adapted easily to different point generation methods,
e.g., point addition, presented in subsequent sections.
Since the optimisation problem in (10) is a 0/1 integer
program, we further relax it by finding a continuous solu-
tion aˆ = [aˆ1, ..., aˆN ]
> where aˆi ∈ [0, 1]. Iterative gradient
methods [6, 13], can be applied to solve (10). In our im-
plementation, we initialised aˆ by setting aˆi = 1 if pi is a
critical point and aˆi = 0, otherwise. We applied the method
in [19] to find the critical points. We empirically observe
that this initialisation scheme improved attack success rate.
Finally, we achieve the final solution a as,
ai =
{
0, if aˆi ≤ 0.5
1, otherwise .
(9)
It is worth noting that in practice, for point perturbation, the
exact value of ai is not important as our goal is to generate
the adversarial examples. We can skip the thresholding and
simply use the approximation aˆiei as the offset to obtain the
adversarial point cloud.
3.2. Point addition
In addition to point perturbation, we can generate an ad-
versarial example P ′ by extending P with a minimum num-
ber of additional points. We show that our proposed formu-
lation in (10) can also be applied in this task. Specifically,
suppose that there are no more than K points added to the
original point cloud P . We can construct a new point set
P˜ including all the points in P and K new points. These
K new points can be generated by randomly choosing K
points in P and adding them to P˜ . Alternatively, one may
choose these K points from the critical point set [19]. We
note that this way of construction of P˜ does not change the
perceptiblity of P as D(P, P˜ ) = 0 for either the Chamfer
or Hausdorff distance used to define D(P, P˜ ). In addition,
both P and P˜ are treated equally by the network F , i.e.,
∀i, Fi(P ) = Fi(P˜ ), as the geometric structure of the point
clouds remains unchanged.
Similarly, we also construct a vector a˜ =
[a˜1, ..., a˜N+K ]
> ∈ {0, 1}N+K and a perturbation set
E˜ = {e˜1, ..., e˜N+K} by extending a and E with K new
elements and solve the optimisation problem in (10) with
a new objective function f(P˜ , a˜, E˜). The vector a˜ is
initialised as follows, a˜i is set to 1 for i ∈ {1, .., N}, and to
a random value in {0, 1}, otherwise. Furthermore, during
the optimisation process, we fix a˜i = 1, ∀i = 1, .., N ,
i.e., original points in P will not be changed. Finally, the
adversarial point cloud P ′ is obtained by including points
p˜i ∈ P˜ such that a˜i = 1.
4. Experiments
4.1. Experiment Setup
Datasets. We used ModelNet40 [29] and ScanOb-
jectNN [25] datasets to evaluate our proposed method. The
ModelNet40 dataset is a popular benchmark for classifica-
tion of 3D CAD models. It consists of 40 object categories,
9,843 models for training and 2,468 models for testing. We
followed Qi et al. [19] to sample the surfaces of the 3D mod-
els uniformly and then normalise the points into a unit cube.
The ScanObjectNN dataset is an object dataset from real-
world indoor scans. It is designed to evaluate object classi-
fication in more practical settings that involve view occlu-
sions and object partiality. ScanObjectNN has 15 object cat-
egories and five challenging variants including objects with
background, translated objects, rotated objects, and scaled
objects. We also followed Uy et al. [25] to normalise the
point clouds using mean and furthest point distance with
data containing background.
Implementation Details. We adopted PointNet [19] as
the targeted network which was used for generating ad-
versarial examples and for attacks. We trained PointNet
with the same settings used in the original paper. For point
clouds with varying sizes, we modified the max-pooling op-
erator in the network accordingly [36]. For our method, we
used Adam optimiser with learning rate of 0.01. We per-
formed an exhaustive search for the parameters in (10) and
empirically set them as λ1 = 1, λ2 = 550, λ3 = 9. And
λ1 = 1, λ2 = 1500, λ3 = 9 for PointNet++. We run 250 it-
erations of stochastic gradient descents in our optimization.
To make the optimisation more efficient, we initialised the
vector a in (10) using critical points, i.e., ai = 1 if pi is
a critical point. The experiments for different initialization
are in the supplementary.
4.2. Evaluation
4.2.1 Baselines
As there is very few work that focuses on the minimality
of adversarial point clouds, we adopted existing adversar-
ial attack methods [36, 28] to make the baselines. Specifi-
cally, we make our baselines by using techniques proposed
by Xiang et al. [30] that can only move a fixed number
of points, and by Zheng et al. [36] and Wicker et al. [28]
that removes a small set of points based on their impor-
tance. Our baselines include: (a) random point selection,
i.e., randomly selecting points for perturbation and addition,
(b) saliency-based point selection [36] using (b.1) critical
count, (b.2) low-score points, (b.3) high-score points, and
(c) critical neighbors [28]. For baseline (a), we randomly
sample points in an input point cloud uniformly. For (b.1),
we use the critical count algorithm in [36] that considers
the number of max-pooled features to rank critical points.
For (b.2) and (b.3), we first compute a point cloud saliency
map for the input point cloud and choose the points based
on the saliency scores. Low- and high-score points refer
to two opposite ranking strategies that choose the lowest or
highest impact points. For (c), we implement the critical
neighbor method [28] that selects critical points based on
their distances from nearby points.
Success Rate Chamfer Distance Hausdorff Distance # Points
(a) Random 55.56 7.47× 10−4 2.49× 10−3 413
(b.1) Critical count [36] 56.52 7.35× 10−4 2.49× 10−3 406
(b.2) Low-score [36] 55.97 6.47× 10−4 2.50× 10−3 358
(b.3) High-score [36] 58.39 7.52× 10−4 2.48× 10−3 424
(c) Critical neighbor [28] 27.75 1.86× 10−4 3.67× 10−2 50
Ours 86.51 1.40× 10−4 1.67× 10−2 34
(a) Point Perturbation
Success Rate Chamfer Distance Hausdorff Distance # Points
(a) Random 43.90 2.16× 10−4 2.49× 10−3 121
(b.1) Critical count [36] 45.13 2.13× 10−4 2.49× 10−3 118
(b.2) Low-score [36] 60.96 1.64× 10−4 2.50× 10−3 89
(b.3) High-score [36] 41.06 2.27× 10−4 2.49× 10−3 128
(c) Critical neighbor [28] 11.16 1.26× 10−4 2.50× 10−3 66
Ours 84.00 1.36× 10−4 1.83× 10−2 31
(b) Point Addition
Table 1. Attack performance to PointNet on ModelNet40.
Figure 1. Adversarial examples generated by our method from ModelNet40. Red points represent selected points.
4.2.2 Attack Results
We report the attack success rate, the perceptibility, and the
number of points used in each baseline and our method in
Table 1 (on ModelNet40) and Table 2 (on ScanObjectNN)
respectively. The number of points are reported as the
rounded average of all perturbed points. We evaluate the
perceptibility using Chamfer and Hausdorff distance. We
note that ScanObjectNN has five different variants. In this
experiment, we used “OBJ BG”, the variant adding back-
ground to objects.
In general, on ModelNet40, our method achieves good
success rate while requiring a small number of process-
ing points compared with other methods. In particular, our
method only uses 3% of the total input points to reach 86%
of success rate. Except the critical neighbor [28], other
baseline methods require roughly 10× larger point sets than
our method does while achieving much lower success rate.
Compared with the critical neighbor [28], our method uses
similar number of points but our success rate is more than
2× higher. Similar performance is found on the OBJ BG
variant of ScanObjectNN dataset (see Table 2). The gen-
erated adversarial examples are also highly imperceptible;
this is shown quantitatively by the small values of both the
Success Rate Chamfer Distance Hausdorff Distance # Points
Random 63.72 6.10× 10−4 2.50× 10−3 340
Critical Count [36] 64.97 6.09× 10−4 2.50× 10−3 340
Low-Drop [36] 63.81 5.49× 10−4 2.50× 10−3 306
High-Drop [36] 66.82 6.16× 10−4 2.47× 10−3 350
Critical Neighbor [28] 38.48 1.72× 10−4 3.83× 10−2 35
Ours 84.37 9.83× 10−5 1.01× 10−2 28
(a) Point Perturbation
Success Rate Chamfer Distance Hausdorff Distance # Points
Random 60.05 1.77× 10−4 2.50× 10−3 97
Critical Count [36] 59.63 1.79× 10−4 2.49× 10−3 97
Low-Drop [36] 60.96 1.64× 10−4 2.50× 10−3 90
High-Drop [36] 57.87 1.87× 10−4 2.50× 10−3 103
Critical Neighbor [28] 14.02 1.01× 10−4 2.49× 10−3 97
Ours 77.86 9.72× 10−5 1.06× 10−2 27
(b) Point Addition
Table 2. Attack performance to PointNet on OBJ BG variant of ScanObjectNN.
Chamfer and Hausdorff distance from the adversarial exam-
ples to the input point cloud. We also observe that there is a
tradeoff between perceptibility and the number of perturbed
points, e.g., the Hausdorff distance is higher than that of the
baselines to account for smaller number of points perturbed.
Fig. 1 visualises the adversarial point clouds generated by
our method from ModelNet40 dataset. As can be seen, com-
pared with other baselines, our method less likely produces
outliers. This is due to the use of constraints on the object
perceptibility in our adversarial generation formula.
Experimental results also show that, point addition per-
forms best among all adversarial generation strategies. In
addition, although the success rate of point addition is gen-
erally lower than that of point perturbation, point addition
requires fewer points and maintains better perceptibility.
To capture the performance trend, we further plot the
success rate over different number of points manipulated
in the perturbation. Fig. 3 illustrates the result. The graph
shows that our method outperforms other methods signifi-
cantly especially when a small set of points are perturbed.
4.2.3 Real-world Data
We also evaluate our method on the entire real-world
dataset, ScanObjectNN. Recall that ScanObjectNN has five
variants corresponding to five challenges, e.g., “OBJ BG”
includes objects with background, “PB T25” includes ob-
jects translated by 25%, post-fixes “R” and “S” denote ro-
tated and scaled objects, respectively. Readers are referred
to [25] for more details of ScanObjectNN dataset. We re-
port the attack performance of our method to PointNet on
the entire ScanObjectNN dataset in Table 3. As shown in
experimental results, our method maintains a success rate
from 80% to 89% by using only 3% of total points. In
addition, we observe that, compared with OBJ BG, other
variants show higher success rates and lower Hausdorff dis-
tance. We show several adversarial examples generated by
our method from two variants of ScanObjectNN in Fig. 2.
In general, compared with OBJ BG, adversarial examples
on PB T50 RS are much harder to recognise. This shows
the vulnerability of real-world data and also suggests the
necessity to validate attack techniques on extreme situations
with minimum attacks. Fig. 4 shows the performance trend
of point perturbations on ScanObjectNN.
4.2.4 Other Network Architectures
To demonstrate that our method is agnostic to the under-
lying network, we further evaluate our method on Point-
Net++ [20], an extension of PointNet to learn local fea-
tures. PointNet++ achieves the state-of-the-art performance
in point cloud object classification. Attack results to Point-
Net++ are reported in Table 4. Experimental results on both
PointNet and PointNet++ confirm that existing point cloud
networks become vulnerable even when a small number of
points in point clouds are perturbed.
4.2.5 Adversarial Defenses
Finally, we evaluate how our adversarial point clouds can
be defended. In this experiment, we use two basic defense
techniques [13]: outlier removal and salient point removal.
Variant Success Rate Chamfer Distance Hausdorff Distance # Points
OBJ BG 84.37 9.83× 10−5 1.01× 10−2 28
PB T25 89.73 9.74× 10−5 9.79× 10−3 31
PB T25 R 89.97 7.80× 10−5 7.85× 10−3 28
PB T50 R 88.90 6.62× 10−5 6.44× 10−3 30
PB T50 RS 88.15 6.73× 10−5 6.80× 10−3 27
(a) Point Perturbation
Variant Success Rate Chamfer Distance Hausdorff Distance # Points
OBJ BG 77.86 9.72× 10−5 1.06× 10−2 27
PB T25 90.11 9.42× 10−5 1.04× 10−3 30
PB T25 R 88.61 7.61× 10−5 8.41× 10−3 27
PB T50 R 86.25 6.47× 10−5 6.73× 10−3 27
PB T50 RS 82.83 6.48× 10−5 6.63× 10−3 31
(b) Point Addition
Table 3. Attack performance to PointNet on entire ScanObjectNN.
Success Rate Chamfer Distance Hausdorff Distance # Points
ModelNet40 73.92 4.54× 10−4 3.69× 10−2 33
OBJ BG 90.44 1.85× 10−4 1.76× 10−2 32
(a) Point Perturbation
Success Rate Chamfer Distance Hausdorff Distance # Points
ModelNet40 52.94 2.96× 10−4 2.68× 10−2 31
OBJ BG 75.61 1.50× 10−4 1.37× 10−2 30
(b) Point Addition
Table 4. Attack performance to PointNet++.
The outlier removal technique first estimates statistical out-
liers from the point set and removes points that have large
standard deviations. The salient point removal operates by
first estimating point saliency and then points from high to
low saliency are removed in order. We show defense results
in Table 4.2.5. In general, it is moderately easy to defend
our adversarial point clouds using the above methods, with
success rate up to 92% of all adversarial examples on Mod-
elNet40. Despite that, we found that such defenses on real-
world data in ScanObjectNN are less effective compared to
that of CAD models in ModelNet40: the success rate is de-
creasing with harder variants in ScanObjectNN. Together
with the fact that real-world data is also more vulnerable
to attacks, this raises significant concerns in applying deep
learning to 3D point clouds in practice.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we introduced a general formulation to gen-
erate adversarial examples of 3D point clouds via `0 optimi-
sation. Our method supports point perturbation and point
addition in a unified framework. We showed that point
cloud neural networks like PointNet and PointNet++ are
vulnerable to attacks that perturb approximately 40/1,024
points, which is only 4% of the total number of points. This
result poses significant challenges in developing counter-
measures to defend against such attacks. We also demon-
strated that point clouds acquired from the real-world data
are even more vulnerable. More studies on the relation be-
tween synthetic and real-world data and how it influences
adversarial examples would be highly recommended.
With increasingly more 3D data used in consumer de-
vices, we envision that adversarial attacks and defenses for
point clouds will become very diverse, making this topic
worthy of future research. First, here we only investigated
how to perturb the 3D coordinates of a point cloud. For real-
world data acquired from depth sensors, colour information
is also available and could serve as an additional channel for
adversarial attacks. It would be useful to study how such in-
formation influences the vulnerability of 3D deep learning.
Besides, it is important to investigate how to implement ad-
Figure 2. Adversarial examples generated by our method from ScanObjectNN dataset (on OBJ BG variant). Red points represent selected
points.
Dataset Outlier
removal [13]
Salient point
removal [13]
ModelNet40 92.60 94.51
OBJ BG 91.55 95.10
PB T25 87.67 92.02
PB T25 R 86.91 91.02
PB T50 R 84.55 90.48
PB T50 RS 85.09 89.70
(a) Point Perturbation
Dataset Outlier
removal [13]
Salient point
removal [13]
ModelNet40 93.97 95.23
OBJ BG 90.12 94.61
PB T25 87.38 92.68
PB T25 R 87.20 92.20
PB T50 R 86.41 90.59
PB T50 RS 85.09 89.70
(b) Point Addition
Table 5. Defense performance.
versarial point clouds in the physical world. The results of
this work show that such an implementation could be prac-
tical as only a few percentages of the input point cloud need
to be modified.
Figure 3. The performance trend of our adversarial attack on the
ModelNet40 dataset. Our method is more effective than all other
methods, requiring only ≈ 4% of all points to be perturbed to
reach 80% success rate.
Figure 4. The performance trend of our adversarial attack on the
OBJ BG variant of the ScanObjectNN dataset. Again, our method
outperforms all remaining methods despite only a small percent-
age of perturbations is performed.
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Supplementary Materials
Abstract
In this supplementary document, we discuss our implemen-
tation details, which includes an extra relaxation to make
our method easy to implement in Tensorflow. We then pro-
vide more quantitative and qualitative experiments on our
adversarial attacks. We show that our optimization can eas-
ily converge and be insensitive to initialization values. We
then provide additional visualizations to the performance
trend of our method on the point addition case. Finally,
we show an experimental transferability test in which ad-
versarial examples generated by our method on PointNet is
applied to PointNet++ and vice versa.
A. Implementation Details
Recall that in the main paper (Equation 5), to generate
the adversarial examples, we need to optimize the following
cost function:
min
a,E
f(P,a, E) = min
a,E
{λ1‖a‖1 + λ2D(P, P ′) + λ3h(P ′)}
(10)
where the relation between the perturbed point cloud P ′ and
the original point cloud P is
P ′ = {p′i = pi + aiei | pi ∈ P} . (11)
Note that here ai ∈ {0, 1} is binary, and ei is continuous.
Theoretically, it is necessary to use integer programming
and linear programming to optimize this cost function. In
practice, we use unconstrained optimization in Tensorflow
to implement the optimization by relaxing ai to be contin-
uous. We only perform a clip to make ai ∈ [0, 1]. Note
that this is plausible given the L1-norm formulation in our
case since most of values in vector a becomes zero after the
optimization. It is not necessary to binarize non-zero val-
ues of a to {0, 1} either because eventually we only need
the product of aiei to perturb the original point cloud. We
found that such relaxation is plausible and our optimization
converges in practice.
Consequently, the iterative updates for variable a can be
written as
a
(n+1)
i = a
(n)
i − γ
∂f
∂ai
(12)
where a(n)i is the solution at the n-th step and γ is calculated
using Adam [10].
For point addition, we allow maximum 1024 points to
be added. We found this way of implementation does not
affect the performance as most elements of are zero. Below,
we show an empirical test where continuous values of are
rounded to binary or kept as is. As can be seen in Table 6,
the difference is minor.
Rounding Success Rate # Points
No rounding 83.488372 25.693
With rounding 83.488372 26.939
(a) Point perturbation
Table 6. Rounding in point perturbation on OBJ BG
Success Rate # Points
Random 89.92 47
Critical Points 86.51 34
(a) Point perturbation
Success Rate # Points
Random 89.35 49
Critical Points 84.00 31
(b) Point addition
Table 7. Different initialization values of our optimization on Mod-
elNet40.
Initialization Success Rate # Points
Random 90.0 41
Critical Points 84.37 28
(a) Point perturbation
Initialization Success Rate # Points
Random 89.53 41
Critical Points 77.86 27
(b) Point addition
Table 8. Different initialization values of our optimization on
OBJ BG.
B. Initialization
We test the various initialization methods for vector a
in Equation (10). For PointNet, we compare random and
critical point initialization related to point perturbation and
addition attack. Table 7 and 8 show that the initialization
using critical points leads to results with good success rate
and fewer point perturbations or additions. This result thus
advocates the use of saliency map for initialization. Using
random initialization works well, too but this technique al-
most doubles the number of perturbed points.
C. Additional Plots
In addition to the performance trend of point perturba-
tion shown in the main paper, here we further provide the
trend for point addition attack on both datasets compare
with the other baseline methods. The results are shown in
Figure 5. The performance trend of our point addition attack on
the Modelnet40.
Figure 6. The performance trend of our point addition attack on
the OBJ BG variant of the ScanObjectNN dataset.
Figure 7. More adversarial examples from point perturbation on
the ModelNet40.
Figure 5 and Figure 6.
D. Additional Visualizations
In the section, we visualize more object categories for
objects in ModelNet40 and ScanObjectNN’s OBJ BG and
PB T50 RS variant (Figure 7, 8, and 9). We also visualize
the adversarial examples from point addition attack (Fig-
ure 10, 11, and 12).
Figure 8. More adversarial examples from point perturbation on
the OBJ BG variant of ScanObjectNN.
Figure 9. More adversarial examples from point perturbation on
the PB T50 RS variant of ScanObjectNN.
Figure 10. More adversarial examples from point addition on the
ModelNet40.
E. Transferability
We feed our adversarial point clouds made by Point-
Net [19] to the PointNet++ [20] as input. We find that both
perturbation and addition attack is challenging to transfer
and the results are shown Table 9. Such results are consis-
tent to that by Xiang et al. [30]. In opposite, we also feed the
adversarial examples on PointNet++ to PointNet. The trans-
fer attack success about 20% with Modelnet40 and OBJ BG
examples.
An interesting observation from the results is that the
Figure 11. More adversarial examples from point addition on the
OBJ BG variant of ScanObjectNN.
Figure 12. More adversarial examples from point addition on the
PB T50 RS variant of ScanObjectNN.
Perturbation Addition
ModelNet40 7.68 6.49
OBJ BG 25.75 25.11
(a) PointNet to PointNet++
Perturbation Addition
ModelNet40 25.66 22.34
OBJ BG 19.55 20.94
(b) PointNet++ to PointNet
Table 9. We experiment with untargeted transfer attacks by gener-
ating the adversarial point clouds on PointNet and applying them
to PointNet++ and vice versa. While the success rate is low, the
results suggest that real-world data is more vulnerable to black box
attacks.
real-world adversarial examples from ScanObjectNN are
easier to transfer than synthetic examples in ModelNet40,
which makes real-world data more vulnerable to black box
attacks. This suggests the need to further make object clas-
sification for real-world data more accurate and robust.
